













The& challenges& for& governments& in& designing& and& implementing& industrial& policies& are& wellT
documented.&There&is,&on&the&one&hand,&a&tension&between&efforts&to&advance&a&vision&of&longT
term&development&and,&on&the&other,&concerns&that&investing&resources&in&a&particular&strategy&
might& turn& out& to& have& been& misguided.& Complicating& those& issues,& there& are& also& tensions&
between&government&actions&aimed&at&encouraging&and&facilitating&economic&activities,&and&the&
government’s& role& as& a& regulator& of& those& activities.&More& specifically,& governments& are& faced&
with& the& task&of&balancing&efforts& to&attract,&promote&and&sustain&business&activities&alongside&
efforts& to& ensure& that& broader& policy& aims& are& served& by,& for& example,& ensuring& companies&
comply&with&laws&on&taxation,&labor&standards,&environmental&protection,&and&consumer&rights.&
But& governments& have& successfully& navigated& those& issues,& actively& shaping& and& promoting&











Importantly,& this& new& regime& is& oneTsided& in& two& important& respects:& first,& it& allows& covered&
investors&to&sue&governments&but&generally&does&not&allow&governments&to&initiate&disputes&to&
sue& investors.& Second,& its& protections& only& permit& challenges& to& government& actions& (or&
omissions)&that&harm&investments,&thus&skewing&in&a&direction&that&puts&pressure&on&government&





for& implementing& industrial& policy.& Investors& have& used& investment& treaties& to& successfully&
challenge& a& range& of& government& conduct& inherent& in& investment& enticement,& approval,& and&






















when&deciding&whether&and&how& international& treaty&standards&should&override&domestic& law,&
and&what&damages&to&order,&tribunals&do&not&always&accord&states&the&deference&typically&said&to&
be& a& feature& of& international& law,& much& less& the& level& of& deference& common& for& reviewing&
allegations&of&harms&to&economic&interests&of&business&entities,&as&opposed&to&violations&of&the&
cogens& rights& and& nonTderogable& rights& of& individuals.& See,& e.g.,& Caroline& Henckels,&Balancing(
Investment( Protection( and( Sustainable( Development( in( Investor8State( Arbitration:( The( Role( of(
Deference(in&Yearbook&on&International&Investment&Law&and&Policy&2012T2013&(Oxford&University&






actions& and& omissions& in& connection&with& encouraging,& admitting& and& regulating& investments.&




The& issues& focused&on&are& liability& for&government&conduct& (1)& in&connection&with& tenders&and&
negotiations;& (2)&when&responding&to&questions&regarding&the& legality&of&the& investment;& (3)& in&
using& performance& requirements& to& leverage& benefits& and& capture& spillovers& from& the&
investment;&(4)&changing&the&legal&framework&governing&an&investment&in&response&to&evolving&
needs,&circumstances,&and& interests;& (5)&administering&the& investment;&and& (6)& requesting,&and&
responding&to&requests&for,&renegotiation.&&
Following& the& cases,& this& paper& concludes& by& outlining& options& for& addressing& and&minimizing&
tensions&between&investment&treaties&and&industrial&policy.&
I I. & TENDERS&AND&NEGOTIATIONS&
PSEG(V.(TURKEY :4&STATE&LIABILITY&FOR&FAILED&NEGOTIATIONS&
Governments& engaging& with& private& entities& for& investment& in& extractives,& infrastructure,& or&
other& projects& commonly& select& their& partners& and& frame& the& deal& through& tenders,& direct&
negotiations,&or&a&combination&of&the&two.&Investors&often&expend&significant&time&and&resources&
engaging& in& those&processes&even& though& there& is&a& risk& that& their&bids&will&be& rejected&or& the&
negotiations&will&collapse.&
Domestic&law&sometimes&provides&unsuccessful&bidders&with&avenues&to&challenge&government’s&
decision.5&Negotiating& parties& might& also& enter& into& preTcontractual& agreements& to& provide&
















power& plant& project,& and& submitted& a& feasibility& study& to& the&Ministry& of& Energy& and& Natural&
Resources&in&order&to&proceed&with&those&plans.&The&Ministry&of&Energy&and&Natural&Resources&
approved&the&study&and,&in&August&1996,&initialed&an&“Implementation&Contract”&with&PSEG&and&





hoped& to& recover& through& increasing& the& government’s& obligations& to& purchase& power& from&
PSEG’s& proposed& plant.& Additionally,& PSEG& proposed& restructuring& the& investment& through& a&









For& one,& Turkey& appeared& increasingly& skeptical& of& the& project’s& benefits,& and&was& concerned&
about&the&nature&and&extent&of&the&financial&obligations&it&would&be&assuming&in&favor&of&PSEG&if&
required&to&purchase&power&from&the&plant&under&the&terms&sought&by&the&investor.&Additionally,&
after& the& tax& law&was& changed& to& remove& the& roughly&USD& 250&million& tax& burden& associated&
with& incorporation&of&the&project&company& in&Turkey,&PSEG&nevertheless&continued&to&demand&
compensation& for& those& alleged& tax& payments& even& though& it& no& longer& had& to& make& them.&




Ultimately,& the& points& of& contention& became& intractable& and& brought& the& collapse& of& the&




and& equitable& treatment& (FET)& standard.& In& reaching& that& conclusion,& it& adopted& an& approach&






246.( The( Tribunal( is( persuaded(…( ( that( the( fair( and( equitable( treatment( standard( has(
been(breached,(and(that(this(breach(is(serious(enough(as(to(attract(liability.(Short(of(bad(
faith,( there( is( in( the( present( case( first( an( evident( negligence( on( the( part( of( the(
administration(in(the(handling(of(the(negotiations(with(the(Claimants.(The(fact(that(key(
points( of( disagreement(went( unanswered( and(were( not( disclosed( in( a( timely(manner,(
that( silence( was( kept( when( there( was( evidence( of( such( persisting( and( aggravating(
disagreement,(that(important(communications(were(never(looked(at,(and(that(there(was(
a(systematic(attitude(not( to(address( the(need( to(put(an(end( to(negotiations( that(were(






As(noted(above,(MENR’s(demands( for(a( renegotiation(went( far(beyond( the(purpose(of(
the(Law(and(attempted(to(reopen(aspects(of(the(Contract(that(were(not(at(issue(in(this(
context(or(even(within(MENR’s(authority.(
248.( Inconsistent( administrative( acts( are( also( evident( in( this( case( in( respect( of( some(






in( law(or(practice,( to( the(continuous(change( in( the(conditions(governing( the(corporate(





endlessly,(as(did( its( interpretation(and( implementation.(While( in(complex(negotiations,(
such(as( those( involved( in( this(case,(many(changes(will(occur(beyond( the(control(of( the(






256.(Even( if(all( the(above(conduct(were( to(comply(with(good( faith,(which( the(Tribunal(
has( no( reason( not( to( believe,( there( still( would( be( an( evident( breach( of( the( fair( and(
equitable( treatment( standard( under( the( Treaty,( and( under( Turkish( law.( To( the( extent(
that(this(caused(damage,(compensation(will(of(necessity(be(awarded.(
The& tribunal’s& decision& thus& imposed& treaty& liability& on& Turkey& for& “negligent”& or& inattentive&
conduct&during&contract&negotiations,&and&for&changes&in&background&law&and&policy&impacting&a&
project& even& before& the& essential& terms& of& that& project& had& been& agreed& (due& to& investorT
requested& changes& to& the&original& Implementation&Contract).& The&PSEG& decision& instructs& that&
governments&may&be&penalized&for&letting&negotiations&drag&on&when&they&are&ambivalent&about&
projects,& and& that& they& might& also& be& found& to& breach& their& treaty& obligations& when& shifting&
policies&and&growing&concerns&about&the&costs&and&benefits&of&a&deal&cause&them&to&walk&away&
from&talks&even&though&they&had&yet&to&crystallize&into&an&agreement.8&&
As& damages,& the& tribunal& ordered& the& government& to& compensate& the& investor& for& costs&
expended& from& the& submission& of& its& feasibility& study& through& continued& negotiations& in& the&





Parkerings( v.( Lithuania10&(tender& for& development& and&operation&of& parking& infrastructure& and&
operations);& F8W( Oil( v.( Trinidad( and( Tobago11((tenders& and& negotiations& for& a& contract& to&
develop&offshore&oil&resources);&and&Nordzucker(v.(Poland12&(negotiations&for&purchase&of&stateT




























Some& countries& apply& a& strict& rule& against& recognizing& or& enforcing& these& defective& contracts&
even& if& the& investor& was& an& innocent& party& misled& by& the& government,& and& irrespective& of&
whether&the&government&was&knowingly&or&negligently&at&fault.&A&rationale&behind&this&approach&
is& that& assessing& financial& responsibility& against& the& government& for& improper&or& unauthorized&
actions& of& its& officials&would& have& the&undesirable& policy& outcome&of& penalizing& the&public& for&
that&wrongful&conduct.&
Tribunals,& however,& have& adopted& a& different& rule,& determining& that& if& the& state& or& a& stateT
owned&entity&were& involved& in&or&aware&of&the& illegality&of&a&particular& investment&agreement,&
that& fact& would& preclude& the& government& from& later& arguing& that& the& illegality& rendered& the&
agreement& null& and& void.& This& issue& arose& in& Kardassopoulos( v.( Georgia.16&In& that& case,& the&
tribunal&determined&that&the&underlying&contracts&for&development&of&petroleum&resources&and&
related& infrastructure& appeared& to& have& been& entered& into& through& ultra( vires& acts& of& stateT
owned& enterprises& and& to& be& void& ab( initio& under& Georgian& law.& It& concluded,& however,& that&
illegality&of&the&contracts&under&domestic& law&did&not&prevent& it& from&taking& jurisdiction&over&a&
dispute&arising&out&of&alleged&contract&rights.&It&reasoned:&
[E]ven(if(the([Joint(Venture(Agreement](and(the(Concession(were(entered(into(in(breach(
of(Georgian( law,( the( fact( remains( that( these( two( agreements(were( “cloaked(with( the(
mantle( of( Governmental( authority”.( Claimant( had( every( reason( to( believe( that( these(
agreements(were(in(accordance(with(Georgian(law,(not(only(because(they(were(entered(
into(by(Georgian(State8owned(entities,(but(also(because(their(content(was(approved(by(












The&tribunal& in&RDC(v.(Guatemala&adopted&a&similar&approach.& In&that&dispute,& the&respondent&
state&had&argued&that&the&private&investor’s&contracts&for&development&and&operation&of&railways&
in&the&country&were&invalid&under&domestic&law&as&they&were&not&secured&through&public&bidding&
as& required,& and&had&not& received& the&necessary& congressional&or&presidential& approvals.& That&
illegality,& Guatemala& contended,& prevented& the& contracts& from& qualifying& as& covered&
“investments”&made&pursuant&to&domestic&law&as&required&by&the&treaty.18&The&tribunal&rejected&
those&arguments&on&grounds&of&fairness.&It&said:&
146.( (Even( if(FEGUA’s(actions( [as( the(government(entity(entering( into( the(contracts](…(
were(ultra(vires((not(“pursuant(to(domestic(law”),(“principles(of(fairness”(should(prevent(
the(government(from(raising(“violations(of(its(own(law(as(a(jurisdictional(defense(when(
[in( this( case,( operating( in( the( guise( of( FEGUA,( it]( knowingly( overlooked( them( and(
[effectively(endorsed(an(investment(which(was(not(in(compliance(with(its(law.”((
147.((Based(on(these(considerations(the(Tribunal(finds(that(Respondent(is(precluded(from(
raising( any( objection( to( the( Tribunal’s( jurisdiction( on( the( ground( that( Claimant’s(
investment(is(not(a(covered(investment(under(the(Treaty(or(the(ICSID(Convention.19(
This& limitation& to& the& legality& requirement& is& notable& in& that& would& effectively& override& some&
countries’& legal& and& policy& decisions& to& strictly& prevent& enforcement& of& illegal& contracts& or&
contracts&secured&through&ultra&vires&conduct.&Due&to&the&difficulties&of&rooting&out&corruption&or&
other&impropriety,&rules&against&enforcement&can&act&as&prophylactic&measures&preventing&such&
wrongful&and&usually&opaque&conduct.&Furthermore,& strengthening& the& force&of& those&rules,&at&
least&some&jurisdictions&do&not&allow&private&entities&to&use&doctrines&of&reliance&or&estoppel&to&
avoid&their&potentially&harsh&effects.20&As&Guatemala&thus&argued& in&RDC,&binding&governments&
to& illegal,& ultra& vires,& or& improperly& secured& contracts& could& “severely& and& improperly& restrict&







May& 18,& 2010,& paras.& 146T47& (quoting& Fraport& AG& Frankfurt& Airport& Services& Worldwide& v.&
Republic&of&the&Philippines,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/03/25,&Award,&August&16,&2007,&para.&346).&
20&In& the&United& States,& see,& e.g.,&Office& of& Personnel&Management& v.& Richmond,& 496&U.S.& 419&
(1990);&Fed.&Crop.&Ins.&Corp.&v.&Merrill,&332&U.S.&380&(1947).&
& 9&
the& State& had& operated& under& that& contract& for& a& period& of& time& could& prevent& a& State& from&
terminating&a&contract&initiated&by&bribery&or&corruption.”21&
Other& relevant& disputes& on& the& impact& of& the& legality& of& investments& include& Inceysa( v.( El(
Salvador22 ((finding& no& jurisdiction& over& investment& secured& through& fraud),& Metal( Tech( v.(













opportunity& that& the& discovery& provided& for& catalyzing& longTterm& sustainable& growth& and&
development& in& the& country.& They& put& in& place& a& legal& regime& designed& to& achieve& that& aim,&
enacting& the& 1987& “Accord& Act”& to,& among& other& objectives,& require& investors& engaging& in&
development& of& the& offshore& resources& to& make& “expenditures& …& for& research& and&
development”&(R&D)&and&“for&education&and&training”&(E&T)&in&the&local&province.26&&
In& the&midT1990s,&Canada&concluded& the&North&American&Free&Trade&Agreement& (NAFTA)&with&
the&United&States&and&Mexico,&which&contains&restrictions&on&performance&requirements& (such&
as&requirements&to&procure&services&locally)&in&its&investment&chapter.&Canada&listed&the&Accord&
Act&as&an&exception&to& the& treaty’s& restrictions&on&performance&requirements.&The&NAFTA&also&
included& within& that& exception& any& “subordinate& measure& adopted& or& maintained& under& the&
authority&of&and&consistent&with&the&[Accord&Act].”&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&










relating& to& investors’& obligations& on&R&D&and&other&matters.& Then,& in& 2004,& Canadian& officials&
issued& new& guidelines& under& the& Accord& Act& which& imposed& additional& and& stronger&
requirements&on&investors&in&the&offshore&oilfields&to&invest&in&R&D&and&E&T.&&
Mobil&objected&to&the&guidelines&and&challenged&them&under&Canadian&law.&After&losing&their&suit&
before& domestic& courts,& the& claimants& initiated& an& investorTstate& arbitration& under& the&NAFTA&
arguing,& in& relevant& part,& that& the& new& guidelines’& heightened& requirements& to& invest& in& R&D&
violated&the&NAFTA’s&prohibitions&on&performance&requirements.&&
Canada& responded& that& the& performance& requirements& were& not& prohibited& by& the& treaty&
because&the&restrictions&on&performance&requirements&did&not&cover&measures&requiring&R&D&or&
E&T.& Canada& also& argued& that& if& the& guidelines& were& deemed& to& constitute& performance&
requirements,& they&were& nevertheless& covered&by& the& government’s& exception& for& the&Accord&
Act&and&its&subordinate&measures.&&
The&tribunal,&however,&sided&with&Mobil&on&both&issues.&It&decided&that&the&NAFTA’s&prohibition&
on& requirements& to& procure& services& locally& included& a& prohibition& on& requirements& for& local&
R&D&and&E&T.&It&then&determined&that&the&new&and&more&demanding&guidelines&departed&from&
previous& practice& to& such& an& extent& that& they& could& not& be& deemed& to& fall& within& Canada’s&
exception&to&the&NAFTA&for&the&Accord&Act&and&its&subordinate&measures.&





MISCELLANEOUS(CASES : & REQUIREMENTS& TO&RESPOND&TO&RENEGOTIATION&
REQUESTS&AND&RESTRICTIONS&ON&INITIATING&THEM&&
International&contracts&–&particularly&those&running&over&long&time&horizons&such&as&contracts&for&
investments& in& infrastructure& or& the& extractive& industries& –& are& often& renegotiated.& Some& of&
these& renegotiations&are& “intraTdeal& renegotiations”,&meaning& that& the& contract& itself&provides&
that&certain&parts&of&the&agreement&may&or&will&be&renegotiated&at&specified&times&or&in&certain&
circumstances.27&The& renegotiation& takes& place& in& accordance& with& the& original& contract.28&An&











existing(agreement.( Forced( renegotiation(of(mineral( concession(contracts(of( the(1960s(
and(1970s,(negotiations(to(reschedule(loans(following(the(Third(World(debt(crisis(of(the(
early(1980s,(and(the(restructuring(of(infrastructure(and(financial(agreements(in(the(wake(
of( the( Asian( financial( crisis( of( the( late( 1990s( all( fit( within( the( category( of( extra8deal(
renegotiations.( In( each( case,( one( of( the( participants(was( seeking( relief( from( a( legally(
binding(obligation(without(any(basis(for(renegotiation(in(the(agreement(itself.30&





treaties&may& impose& an& additional& layer& of& obligations& and& potential& liability& on& governments&
relating&to&their&conduct&in&pursuing&or&responding&to&requests&for&intraTdeal&renegotiations.&&
In&PSEG(v.(Turkey,& as&noted&above,& the& tribunal& signaled& that& investors&are&“entitled& to&expect&
that& [their]&negotiations& [will]&be&handled&competently&and&professionally,”&and&that& there&will&
be&a&breach&of&the&FET&obligation&if&those&expectations&are&not&met.31&In&Saluka(v.(Czech(Republic,&
the& tribunal& stated& that& the& treaty’s& FET& provision& required& the& state& to& “take[]& seriously& a&
proposal& that& has& sufficient& potential& to& solve& the& [relevant]& problem& and& deal& with& it& in& an&
objective,& transparent,& unbiased& and& evenThanded& way.”32 &Citing& those& two& decisions,& the&
tribunal& in&Frontier(Services(v.(Czech(Republic&declared&that&the&requirement&of&good&faith&was&
central&to&the&FET&standard&and&that&a&failure&to&negotiate&in&good&faith&would&thus&violate&the&
treaty&obligation.33&It& added& that& liability& could& still& attach&even& if& the& state&were&not&acting& in&
bad&faith.&34&














challenged& before& Guatemalan& courts,& that& those& courts& had& upheld& the& legitimacy& of& the&
government’s&conduct&under&Guatemalan&law,&and&that&there&was&no&indication&or&allegation&of&
a&denial&of&justice&or&corruption&in&those&judicial&proceedings,&did&not&prevent&the&tribunal&from&






Ultimately,& the& tribunal& determined& that& Guatemala& violated& the& investment& treaty& when& it&
decided& to& rely& on& one& expert& report& regarding& appropriate& tariff& calculations& rather& than&
another&expert&report,&and,&according&to&the&tribunal,&did&not&provide&adequate&reasons&for& its&
choice.&&&
Some& cases& indicate& that& treatyTbased& obligations& to& renegotiate& are& obligations& regarding&
results& that& are& binding& on& the& government,& rather& than& merely& obligations& as& to& process& or&
efforts.& In& Impregilo(v.(Argentina,39&the&tribunal&determined&that&the&government&breached&the&
FET& obligation& by& not& renegotiating& the& water& and& sanitation& services& concession& in& order& to&





on(which( tariffs(would(be(calculated]40(no( longer(existed(and( that,(according( to(Article(
12.1.1,( it( was( then( incumbent( on( the( Province,( in( order( to( treat( AGBA( in( a( fair( and(
equitable( manner,( to( find( appropriate( solutions( to( restore( the( envisaged( balance.( In(
other(words,(since(the(new(exchange(rate(caused(by(the(abolition(of(the(fixed(legal(rate(
had( highly( detrimental( effects( on( AGBA,( the( Province( should( have( offered( AGBA( a(








11,820& shall& be& based& on& the& general& principle& that& tariffs& shall& cover& all& operating& expenses,&
maintenance& expenses& and& service& amortization& and& provide& a& reasonable& return& on&










330.( Since( the( disturbance( of( the( equilibrium( between( rights( and( obligations( in( the(





took( any( measures( to( create( for( AGBA( a( reasonable( basis( for( pursuing( its( tasks( as(
concessionaire( which( had( been( negatively( affected( by( the( emergency( legislation,(
including(the(New(Regulatory(Framework.(
331.(In(these(circumstances,(the(Arbitral(Tribunal(considers(that(Argentina,(by(failing(to(




The& tribunal’s& decision& thus& seems& to& read& the& FET& obligation& as& imposing& a& duty& on& the&
government&to&not&only&offer&or&engage&in&a&renegotiation&effort,&but&to&secure&an&outcome&fair&
to& the& investor& “restor[ing]& a& reasonable& equilibrium& in& the& concession.”& Yet& where,& as& in&
Impregilo,& the& claimant& in& the& treaty& dispute& is& a& minority& shareholder& in& the& domestic&
concessionaire,&and&that&the&concessionaire&is&not&a&party&to&the&treatyTbased&dispute&before&the&
tribunal,& it& likely& becomes& particularly& difficult& to& identify& whether& the& failure& to& restore&
equilibrium&was&due&to&conduct&of&the&government,&the&concessionaire,&or&both&parties.&&
Moreover,& in& this& case& a& duty& to& successfully& renegotiate& the& contract&would& likely& have&been&
particularly& challenging& due& to& the& fact& that& the& government& –& even& prior& to& the& country’s&
financial& crisis& and& currency& devaluation& –& had& been& facing& various& requests& by& the&
concessionaire& to& renegotiate& the& deal& by& reducing& its& investment& commitments& and& service&
obligations,& and& might& have& wanted& to& avoid& counterproposals& it& was& unwilling& to& accept.&
Indeed,& as& the& tribunal& noted& in& support& of& its& finding& of& liability,& the& government& appeared&
“reluctant& to& renegotiate& the& Concession& Contract”& and& was& concerned& about& making&
“adjustments& in& favor& of& the& [concessionaire]& …& as& this& would& have& negative& effects& for& the&






in& part& to& the& concessionaire’s& demands& being& unreasonable. 43 &Nevertheless,& under& the&
tribunal’s& interpretation& of& the& treaty’s& rule,& it& appears& that& the& government& is& subject& to&




judges& agree& that& the& FET& obligation& incorporates& these& requirements& of& good& faith,&
transparency,&or&administrative&due&process&whether&in&intraTdeal&reviews&or&renegotiations,&or&
other&circumstances.&The&cases&highlighted&here&are&not&used&to&show&what&the&law&is,&but&what&
the& decision& might& be,& lest& any& state& be& unsure& what& potential& liability& arises& as& a& result& of&
investment&treaties.&&
EXTRATDEAL&RENEGOTIATIONS&
ExtraTdeal& renegotiations& involve& intense&challenges&and&pressures,&not& least&because& they&are&
usually&unwanted&by&one&party:&
Unlike(negotiations(for(the(original(transaction,(which(are(generally(fueled(by(both(sides’(




new( venture( participate( willingly,( if( not( eagerly,( one( party( always( participates(
reluctantly,( if( not( downright( unwillingly,( in( an( extra8deal( renegotiation.( Beyond(mere(
disappointed( expectations,( extra8deal( renegotiations,( by( their( very( nature,( can( create(
bad( feeling( and(mistrust.( One( side( believes( it( is( being( asked( to( give( up( something( to(
which( it(has(a( legal(and(moral(right.( It(views(the(other(side(as(having(gone(back(on( its(
word,(as(having(acted(in(bad(faith(by(reneging(on(the(deal.( Indeed,(the(reluctant(party(
may(even(feel(that(it(is(being(coerced(into(participating(in(extra8deal(renegotiations(since(
a( refusal( to( do( so( would( result( in( losing( the( investment( it( has( already( made( in( the(
transaction.44(
These&characteristics&of&extraTdeal& renegotiations&are&evident& in&and& important& for&considering&










Alternatively,& if& the& investor& seeks& renegotiation,& the& government& has& no& recourse& under& the&
investment&treaty.& Investment&treaties&give& investors,&not&states,&protections&and&the&ability&to&
initiate&investorTstate&disputes.&&




not& states& –& are& commonly& the& drivers& for& extraTlegal& renegotiations.& Indeed,& one& review& of&




or& operator.& In& 26& percent& the& government& initiated& the& renegotiation.& The& remaining& cases&
consisted&of&those&in&which&both&the&concessionaire&and&the&government&sought&renegotiation.46&&
That& study& shows& that& firmTled& renegotiations& are& particularly& common& in& cases& where& the&
contract& was& awarded& through& competitive& bidding& as& opposed& to& direct& negotiations.& This,&
researchers& explain,& appears& to& reflect& the& fact& that& investors& are& able& to& secure& contracts& by&
underbidding& (e.g.,& on& tariffs)& or& overbidding& (e.g..& on& payments& to& the& government& and&
investment& contributions),& with& the& intent& or& effect& of& subsequently& opportunistically&





cap& system& of& regulating& tariffs)& rather& than& the& government& (e.g.,& through& a& rateTofTreturn&
method),48&and&when&the&government&is&susceptible&to&renegotiation,&which&may&be&due&to&such&







45&Guasch,& p.& 81.& According& to& the& study,& 30& percent& of& these& concessions&were& renegotiated.&
Among&the&concession&contracts&for&water&and&sanitation&services,&that&number&was&74&percent,&












with& significant& fixed& assets& in& the& host& country& becomes& hostage& to& government& power& and&
discretion,51&the& dominance& of& this& narrative& obscures& a& different& reality& –& one& in& which& the&
government&is&held&hostage&to&opportunistic&renegotiations.&
Against&that&background,&it&is&especially&crucial&to&review&how&tribunals&have&treated&extraTlegal&




while& placing& pressure& on& governments& to& come& back& to& the& table& when& requested& by& the&
investor.&
Government)led,Renegotiations,
Various& investment& disputes& have& arisen& precisely& out& of& a& scenario& in&which& the& change&was&
requested&by&the&government,&putting&the&investor&in&the&position&of&the&reluctant&renegotiator.&
In,& response,& investors& have& used& investment& arbitration& (or& the& threat& of& arbitration)& to&
challenge&government&efforts&to&“pressure”&them&to&renegotiate&deals.&&
Investors&have&succeeded&on&these&claims,&with&at&least&some&tribunals&finding&that&governments&
violate& the& investment& treaties&when& trying& to& get& their& contracting&party& to& renegotiate& their&
deal.52&The& motives& and& methods& used& to& secure& renegotiations& have& also& been& relevant& to&
tribunals’& views&on& liability,& as& investors&–&with&varying&degrees&of& success&–&have&argued& that&
governments’& “political”& motives& and/or& exercises& of& sovereign& powers& are& key& factors&
supporting&treaty&breach.&
&One&case&highlighting&these&issues&is&Vivendi(v.(Argentina(II,&in&which&the&tribunal&concluded&that&
government& officials& in& an& Argentine& province& breached& the& investment& treaty& by& improperly&
pressuring&the&concessionaire&to&renegotiate&the&agreement.&&
In& that& case,& even& before& the& concession& was& awarded,& there& was& notable& opposition& to& the&












previously& experienced.53&Media& attention& on& the& concession& and& its& operation& intensified;& an&
independent&ombudsman&advised&water&users&of&their&legal&rights&and&remedies&regarding&issues&




agreement’s& consistency& with& the& law.& There& was,& therefore,& notable& pressure& on& the&
government&to&address&these&concerns;&prompting& its& requests& for&renegotiations&of& the&tariff,&
but&also&contemplating&that&the&investor&would&be&able&to&reduce&its&investment&commitments&
and&obligations&to&extend&service.&
Reviewing& these& events,& the& tribunal& concluded& that& the& government& had& “mounted& an&
illegitimate& ‘campaign’& against& the& concession,& the& concession& Agreement,& and& the& ‘foreign’&
concessionaire& from& the&moment& it& took& office,& aimed& either& at& reversing& the& privatization& or&
forcing& the& concessionaire& to& renegotiate& (and& lower)& CAA’s& tariff’s.”54&The& tribunal& further&
declared& that& the& government’s& “soTcalled& regulatory& activity& constituted& ongoing,& unfair& and&
inequitable& behavior& because& it& was& no& more& than& politically& driven& armTtwisting& aimed& at&




actions&were&motivated& by& “political”& concerns& and& through& public& and& governmental&means.&
The& tribunal& highlighted& the& role& of& the& individual& legislators,& legislature,& ombudsman,&
concession& regulator,& and& the& governor& of& the& province& as& forming& part& of& this& political&
“campaign”& against& the& concessionaire& and& criticized& the& government’s& apparent& role& in&
harming,&rather&than&improving,&the&relationship&between&the&concessionaire&and&the&public.&&
This&approach&raises&a&number&of&issues&for&governments.&For&one,&through&such&a&totality&of&the&
circumstances& approach& where& liability& is& based& on& the& perception& of& a& “campaign”&
implemented& by& a& variety& of& different& actors& who& accountable& to& different& individuals& and&
groups&within&and&outside&the&government,&the&tribunal&applied&a&standard&that&can&be&breached&
even&if&each&individual&act&making&up&that&“campaign”&could&not&or&would&not&give&rise&to&liability&
under& domestic& or& international& law.56&This& standard&may& be& particularly& difficult& for& states& to&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
53&The& tribunal& downplayed& these& events& by& noting& that& although& they& were& “unquestionably&
unpleasant”& they& lasted& “only”& about& two& weeks& (for& the& black& turbidity),& “only”& impacted& a&
“relatively& small& part& of& the& population& (5T10%)& (for& the& red& turbidity),& and& posed& no& known&




56&Id.& para.& 7.5.29& (referring& to& the& measures& “taken& cumulatively”);& id.& paras.& 7.4.38T7.4.39&




communications& to& the& public,& government& responses& to& public& outcries,& and& legislative&
establishment& of& investigative& committees& –& are& common& if& not& encouraged& in& democratic&
governments.& Indeed,& such&actions& as& are&often&even&given&enhanced& free& speech&protections&
and&immunities&from&discovery&and/or&liability&in&order&to&avoid&chilling&them.&&&
Moreover,& the& tribunal’s& approach& focusing& on& the& “political”& motives& for& the& government’s&
efforts&to&renegotiate&the&contract&fails&to&take&into&account&that&governments&likely&will&by&their&






Other& tribunals&have&similarly& focused&on& the&nature&or&mode&of&government&conduct&used& to&
bring&a&private&party&back&to&the&negotiating&table.57&In&PSEG(v.(Turkey,&when&the&claimant&had&
sought&government&approval&to&convert&its&public&law&contract&to&a&private&law&one&giving&it&the&
right& to& arbitrate& disputes,& the& government& indicated& that& it&would& only& agree& to& support& the&
claimant’s& application& if& the& claimant& agreed& to& renegotiate& certain& aspects& of& the& underlying&







private(party(to(change(or(give(up( its(contractual(rights.( If( the(state(has(the(conviction(
that(its(contractual(obligations(to(its(investors(should(no(longer(be(observed((even(if(it(is(
a( commercial( contract,(which( is( the( case),( the( state(would(have( to(end( such(contracts(
and(assume(the(contractual(consequences(of(such(early(termination.59&
With&respect&to&the&motives,&the&AES(v.(Hungary& tribunal&said&–& in&contrast&to&Vivendi( II&–&that&
“political”& reasons& for& taking& action& could&weigh& against,& rather& than& in& favor& of& liability.& That&
















In& another& departure& from& the& Vivendi( II& approach,& in& Electrabel( v.( Hungary,& the& tribunal&
rejected& the& claimant’s& assertion& that& Hungary’s& actions& seeking,& inter& alia,& renegotiations& of&
power& purchase& agreements,&were& improperly& driven& by& “political”&motives& and& thus& violated&
the&FET&obligation.61&The&tribunal&stated:&
There( is( no( doubt( that( by( late( 2005( and( early( 2006( there( was( political( and( public(
controversy( in( Hungary( over( the( perceived( high( level( of( profits( made( by( Hungarian(
Generators,( including( Dunamenti.( However,( politics( is( what( democratic( governments(
necessarily(address;(and( it( is(not,( ipso(facto,(evidence(of( irrational(or(arbitrary(conduct(





relevant& contract& to& enter& into& or& conclude& those& renegotiations,& investment& treaties& may&
impose& certain& requirements& regarding& how& to& respond& to& those& renegotiation& requests.& In&
Biwater( v.( Tanzania,& for& instance,& the& tribunal& recognized& that& the& government& had& no& legal&
obligation& under& the& contract& to& enter& into& the& broad& renegotiations& sought& by& the& water&
services& concessionaire,& but& that& it& nevertheless& decided& to& accommodate& the& concessionaire&
and&engage&in&those&discussions.&Rather&than&rejecting&the&claimant’s&claim&that&the&government&




require& that& the& renegotiations& be& conducted& within& a& limited& timeframe,63&and& was& also& not&













As& this& paper& illustrates,& investment& treaties& impose& vaguely& worded& but& often& broadly&
interpreted&obligations&on&host&states,&and&typically&provide&foreign&investors&a&right&to&enforce&
those& obligations& through& investorTstate& arbitration.& Through& their& standards& and& arbitration&
mechanisms,&these&treaties&can&expose&host&countries&to&significant&potential&and&actual&liability,&
and&can&have&profound&impacts&on&the&development&and&implementation&of&industrial&and&other&
public& policies.&Moreover,& the& long& lives& of& the& agreements& and& the& degree& to& which& arbitral&
awards& are& insulated&against& judicial& review&make& it& difficult& for& states& to& address& and& correct&
unintended&and&unforeseen&impacts&of&the&treaties.&
While& states& can& take& a& fresh& look& at& issues& regarding& the& optimal& design& of& their& investment&
treaties&when&negotiating&new&texts,&they&are&more&limited&in&terms&of&how&they&address&issues&
that&have&arisen&under&existing&treaties.&Nevertheless,&given&the&number&of&existing&agreements&
(over& 3,000& worldwide),& the& potentially& broad& obligations& they& impose,& and& their& extended&
duration,& it& is& crucial& for& states& to& also& examine& those& treaties& and& take& steps& to& clarify&
uncertainties&and&ambiguities&so&that&the&texts&best&reflect&the&signatory&states’&intent.&&
For& existing& treaties,& states& have& three& main& options:& (1)& termination& of& the& treaty,& (2)&
negotiation&of&amendments&to&the&treaty& (or&supplanting&existing&agreements&with&new&ones),&
and&(3)&interpretations&and&clarifications&of&treaty&provisions&that&must&be&taken&into&account&by&
tribunals& interpreting& the& treaties.& All& three& are& important& to& consider& as& part& of& an& overall&
strategy&for&aligning&investment&agreements&to&domestic&policy&goals.&
